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By Letter of 12 November 1981 the President of the Council of the 
European Communities requested the European Parliament to deliver 
an opinion on the proposal from the Commission of the European 
Communities to the Council for a directive recommendation on tariffs 
for scheduled air transport between Member States. 
On 16 November 1981 the President of the European parliament referred 
this proposal to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs as 
the committee responsible and to the Committee on Transport for an 
opinion. 
At its meeting of 24 November 1981 the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs appointed Miss Forster rapporteur •. 
The committee considered the Commission's proposal and the draft 
report at its meetings of 27-28 April 1982, 18-19 Ma1 1982 and 3-4 
November 1982. 
At the Last meeting, the committee decided unanimously with 3 
abstentions to recommend to Parliament that it approve the Commissiorl's 
proposal with certain amendments: 
The committee then adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole 
by 6 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions. 
At the plenary session on 17 December 1982 the report was referred 
back to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, pursuant to 
Rule 85, at the conclusion of voting on the ~mendments to the 
prop·osed Directive, but before a final vote on the Directive as a whole. 
The Ca..ittee considered the results of the·votes in Parliament, the proposed 
amendments to the- directive and the accOtnPanying motion fo·r a resolution at its 
meetingsof25-26 May 1983 and 14-16 June 1983. At the latter meeting the draft 
directive as re-amended by the Committee was adopted on a unanimous vote with 
3 abstentions, and the motion for a resolution was then adopted by a vote of 11 
in favour to 5 against with 2 abstentions. 
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Present at the vote : Mr Moreau, chairman; Mr Hopper and Mr Oeleau, vice chairmen; 
Miss Forster, rapporteur; Mr Alvanos (deputizing for Mr Fernandez>, Mr Albers 
(deputizing for Mr Mihr>·, Mr Beazley, Mr von Bismarck, Mrs Desouches, Mr de Goede, 
Mr Halligan (deputizing for Mr Caborn>, Mr Heinemann, Mr Leonardi, Mr Muller-Hermann, 
Mrs Nielsen (deputizing for Mr Oelorozoy>, Mr Papantontou, Mr Schinzel, Mr Welsh 
and Mr von Wogau. 
The opinion of the Committee on Transport is attached. 
At the Plenary Session of 4 July 1983 the report was vithdrawn 
fro. the Agenda pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Procedure and 
referred back for further consideration to the Comaittee on 
Econa.ic and Monetary Affairs. I 
The report was again discussed-at the Comaittee's •eeting on 19-20 
September 1983 and 27-28 September 1983. At the tatter •eeting, 
and after having heard Mr Kontogeorgis, the member of the Commission 
responsible for this issue, the Committee voted by 10 votes in favour 
to 5 against to refer both the amendments to the draft directive and the 
accompanying motion for a resolution back to the plenary without ~odfficatfon. 
The following took part in the vote : 
Mr MOREAU (Chairman); Miss FORSTER (Rapporteur); Mr ALBERS (replacing 
Mr Rogers>; Mr BEAZLEY; Mr BEUMER (replacing Mr Vergeer); Mr von BISMARCK; 
Mrs OESOUCHES; Mr FORTH; Mr HERMAN; Mr LEONAROI; Mr MOORHOUSE (replacing 
Mt Hopper); Mrs f.NIELSEN; Mr PAPANTONIOU; Mr ROGALLA (replacing Mr Wagner>; 
Mr WEDEKIND <replacing Mr Schnitker). 
The depot was made on 4 October 1983. 
- 3 - PE 84.317/fin./II/rev. 
~ : 
CONTENTS 
Compromise text of rapporteur compared 
to the text proposed by the Commission 
of the European Communities and the 
amendments to the Directive as voted 
by Parliament on 17 December 1982 •••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
A. Motion for a Resolution •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 18 
B. Explanatory Statement •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 23 
Annex •••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••• 42 
Opinion of the Committee on Transport ....•..........• 40 
- 4 -
PE 84.317/fin./II/rev. 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following amendments to the Commission's proposal and motion for a resolution together 
with explanatory statement: 
Proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a directive 
<EEC> on tariffs for scheduled air transport between MeMber States 
Text proposed by the Commission 
of the European Communities 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community and in particular 
article 84 C2> thereof; · 
having regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
having regard to the opinion of the European 
Parliament; 
having regard to the op1n1on of the Economic 
and Social Committee; 
whereas more flexible procedures for controlling 
scheduled passenger air fares for air services 
between Member States will. give air carriers 
greater scope to develop markets and meet 
consumer needs; 
~o..1ereas common rules to define fair prices should 
b~ established and whereas such rules should lay 
down criteria for the establishment of air fares 
so that they bear a re5onAble relationship to the 
costs of an efficient air carrier; 
- 5 -
Text of the directive as adopted by the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
after having been referred back to the 
Committee by Parliament on 17 December 
1982 . 
(Unchanged> 
(Unchanged> 
(Unchanged> 
(Unchanged> 
<unchanged) 
<Unchanged) 
whereas common rules should lay down 
criteria for the establishment of 
air fares which are in a reasonable 
relationship to ~he operating costs 
of an efficient air carrier; 
PE 84.317/fin./II/rev. 
whereas disruptive effects on the air transport 
system in the Community should be avoided and 
in particular appropriate measures should be 
taken to preve~selling below cost including 
a reasonable margin for overheads and profit; 
whereas due attention should be paid to the 
requirements of various user categories in 
establishing fares, while at the same time 
the tariff structure should remain as simple 
as possible; 
whereas fares should be offered on clear and 
understandable conditions; 
whereas air carriers should be free to establish 
air tariffs individually, but should be 
permi~ted to consult with other airlines for the 
purpose of fixing the terms of interlining 
arrangements, given the important benefits 
conferred by interlining facilities on air 
transport in the Community and in the world; 
whereas within the air transport sector 
differences in social conditions between 
Member States exist; 
whereas provision should be made for rapid 
consultation between Member States in the 
case of any disagreement and for 
procedures for settling such disagreements 
as are not resolved by consultation; 
(Unchanged> 
<Unchanged> 
(Unchanged> 
whereas air carriers should be free to 
eltiOlish air tariffs individually 
but should be permitted to consult,with 
other airlines for certain other 
purposes such as fixing the terms of 
interlining arrangements, given the 
important benefits conferred by 
interlining facilities on air tranr~rt 
in the Community and in the worl , 
(Unchanged> 
(Unchanged) 
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whereas provision should be made for the regular 
consultation of consumer groups on matters 
relating to air fares; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE 
SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
1. This directive applies to government 
procedures and criteria to be applied with 
respect to the fixing of scheduled air 
tariffs for passengers and air freight, 
established by air carriers for carriage 
between a point in one MeMber State to a 
point in another Member State. 
8.!:!i£1~-' 
2. For the purposes of this directive 
a> Air tariffs mean the prices.to be paid in the 
applicable local legal tender for the carriage 
by air of passengers, baggage and freight, in 
accordance with the conditions under which those 
prices apply, including prices and conditions 
offered to intermediaries; 
b> Air carrier means an air transport enterprise 
which is authorised by two or more Member States 
to operate scheduled international air services 
between those states; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE 
SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
1.· This directive applies to govern-
ment procedu~e~ and criteria to be 
applied with ·respect to the fixing of 
scheduled air tariffs for passengers 
· and air freight, established by air 
c·~rr,iert for or involving carriage 
'between a poirt in one Me111ber State 
to a point in another Member State. 
<Unchanged> 
<Unchanged> 
b) Air carrier means an air transport 
enterprise which is established in 
the C~unity and is effectively con-
trolled through-a substantial share in 
its owners:lip or otherwise by one or 
•ore Member States and/or by nationals 
of Member States, or is authorized by 
one or more Member States to operate 
scheduled international air services 
within the Community. 
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c) State of or1g1n means the Member State from (Unchanged) 
which the carriage commences in respect of which 
an air tariff is established, i.e. both for single 
and return air tariffs; 
d) State of destination means the Member State in (Unchanged) 
which the carriage terminates in respect of which 
an air tariff is established; 
e> States concerned •ean the state of origin (Unchanged} · 
and the state of destination; 
f) Interlining means a facility conferred by a 
ticket or an airwaybill granting the right to 
use more than one airline for the carriage; 
g) Scheduled air service means a series of 
flights each possessing all the following 
characteristics: 
i) it is performed by aircraft for the transport 
of passengers or cargo for remuneration, in 
such a manner that each flight is open to 
use by members of the public; 
ii) is operated so as to serve traffic between 
the same two or more points, either 
<1> according to a published timetable, or 
<2> with flights so regular or frequent that 
they constitute a recognized systematic 
series. 
- 8 -
(Unchanged) 
(Unchanged) 
(Unchanged) 
(Unchanged) 
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CRITERIA 
~!:!iS.!:!-~. 
1. The states concerned shall take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that air tariffs 
a) are reasonably related to the costs of an 
efficient air carrier on the assu.ption that its 
principal place of business is located in the state 
or origin, while allowing for a satisfactory return 
on investment and taking due account of the 
characteristics of the route; 
b) are suffici~nt to cover the costs of the 
carrier on the route in question plus a 
reasonable margin for overheads and profit; 
c) have due regard to the requirements of 
various user c~tegories and encourage the develop-
ment of demand·by new categories of users while 
the tariff structure shall remain as simple as 
possible; 
d) are offered on conditions which are clear 
and understandable. 
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CRITERIA 
art!s.!:!-~ 
1. The states concerned sha-ll 
take all appropriate measures to 
ensure that the airlines concerned 
.. 
offer air tariffs that 
a) are reasonably related to the 
overall costs of the applicant air 
carrier including a satisfactory return 
on investment on the assuMPtion that 
its principal place of bu~iness is 
located in the State of o~igin; 
b) are sufficient to cover the direct 
operating costs of t~e applicant carrier 
on the route in question plus a reason-
able margin for overheads and profit, 
taking due account of the 'characterist1cs 
of the route. Where the state of origin 
decides that the route merits some 
subsidy for social or other special 
reasons, such as in peripheral regions, 
it shall invite the Commission to deter-
mine if a subsidy can be justified within 
the terms of Article 92<3>c of the TreatY. 
' ' . 
<Unchanged) 
<Unchanged) 
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----.~-----. 
2. An air carrier shall, however, be permitted 
to match an existing tariff, which has been 
approved for another airline in accordance 
with this Directive for the same route with the 
same originating point. 
PROCEDURES 
Member States shall permit an air carrier to 
establish air tariffs: 
a> individually, or 
b) at the option of that air carrier, following 
consultation with any other airline<s> for the 
purpose of fixing the terms of interlining or in 
order to simplify and standardise conditions 
associated with air tariffs. Member States 
concerned and the Commission may participate 
as observers at these consultations. 
1. ~ithout prejudice to the provisions of 
article 6 hereof, air tariffs shall be approved 
by the states concerned. 
2. For this purpose air tariffs established by an 
air carrier shall be filed with the states 
concerned. 
3. Such filing may be required by those states 
not more than 60 days before the entry into force 
of the air tariffs. 
- 10 -
2. An air carrier, ~hall however; be 
permitted to match an existing tariff. 
applied by another airline. 
PROCEDURES 
(Unchanged > 
(Unchanged ) 
b) at the option of that air carrier 
following consultations with any other 
airline<s>·; provided that representat-
ives of governments and the Comais•'on 
are fully entitled to take part .. such 
consultations1provided that the Commission has certified that the con-
consultation is generally in accord with 
the provisions of Article 85 (1) of the 
Treaty of Rome. 
att!U!-~ 
<Unchanged> 
2. For this purpose ai.r t.arif,fs propos•ed 
by an air carrier shall be submitted to 
the States concerned for approval. 
3. Such submission may be requi'red by 
those States not more than 60 days before 
the entry into force of the air tariffs. 
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·-·-- ... ·· 
4. Approval may be given expressly, but unless 
one of those states decides otherwise within 30 
days following the fili.ng the filed air tariffs 
shall be considered as approved. 
~ .. cu~~~-~ 
1. When a state concerned (hereafter called 
the first state> decides not to approve an 
ai r .. tariff in confor111ity with article 5.4, it 
shall inform the airline and the other atate 
concerned (hereafter called the second state> 
in writing stating its reasons. 
2. If the second state agrees with the decision 
of the first state, the state of origin shall 
request the airline concerned to file a new 
air tariff. 
3. If the second state disagrees with the 
decision of the first state, it shall so 
notify the first state within 2 weeks of being 
informed and request a consultation. The first 
state shall make its representatives available 
at short notice for consultation on the air 
tariff(s). For this consultation the states 
concerned shall on request supply all relevant 
information to each other. At the consultation 
the states concerned shall endeavour to agree 
on the air tariff as filed or agree on 
modifications thereto. 
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4. Approval may be gi.ven e)tpressly, but 
unless one of those States decides other-
wise within 30 days following the sub-
Mission the proposed air tariffs shalt 
be considered 'as approved. · 
1. When 1 state concerned (hereafter 
called the first state) decides not to 
approve an air tariff in conformity w·hh 
Artichi S.4 it shall inform the airline 
and the other state concerned <hereafter 
called the second $tate) in writing 
stating its reasons. · 
2. If the second state agrees with~the 
decision of the first state the air tariff 
shall not come into force. 
3. If the second state disagrees with 
the decision of the first state the states 
.concerned shall attempt to resolve their 
disagreement by a method of their choice 
in·accordance wi~h the bilateral or inter~ 
national agreements in force. If the 
stattl are unable to reach an agreement 
either of the states may request that the· 
dispute be referred for a decision to a 
special advisory committee to which each 
state shall appoint a member within one 
month of a request being made •. The two 
members shall agree to a·third member 
preferably a Commission representative, 
within. two weeks of the expiry of this 
one month period. 
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4. If at the expiry of one month after the date 
on which ~he second state was notified 
disagreement still persists, the state of origin· 
can approve the air tariff unilaterally, after 
having ascertained that the criteria of article 
3 are met, or subject to such modifications as 
will make it comply with article 3. In this 
case the air tariff shall come into force two 
weeks after the approval of the state of 
origin except where the other state concerned 
within this period refers the matter to the 
Commission for decision under paragraph 6. 
5. Where no agreement is reached under 
the procedure set out in paragraph 3, or 
where action is taken under paragraph 4, 
the dispute May, at the request of any 
Member State concerned, be referred to 
the Commission. 
6. The Commission shall within 30 working 
days of the date of referral after consulting 
the Member States concerned take a decision. 
Upon referral of a dispute to the Commission, 
the states concerned shall immediately •ake 
available all pertinent information at their 
disposal to the Commission. The Commission 
shall notify its decision to the states 
concerned. 
4. If one of the states fail~ to appoint 
a member or no agreement is reached as 
regards the third member within the times 
specified the vacant positiona shall be 
filled with persons appointed by the 
Commission. 
5. The advisory committee shall take a 
decision within 30 working days after the 
appointment of the third arbitrator on the 
conformity of the air.tariff to the 
criteria l'aid down in Article 3. Unpon 
referral of a disput to the Committe~ the 
states concerned shall immediately make· 
available all pertinent information at 
their disposal. The advisory committee 
shall notify its deci-sion to the states 
concerned. 
6. In the absence of a decision by the 
advisory committee within 30 days from the 
date of referral the air tariff shall come· 
into effect until such date as the 
decision of the advi.sory committee coines 
into force. 
- 12 -
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7. In the absence of a decision by the ComMission 
within 30 working days from the date of referral 
the air tariff shall co•e into effect until such 
date as the decision of the Commission comes into 
force. 
7 The operation and statue of tht 
s~ecial advisory comm~ttee shall ~~ -;;' 
analogous to the comm1ttee establ1sh~~ 
by Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. 
,, 
' , 
.,:;, 
'" 'f 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. At least once a year, each Member State 
shall call on an Air Transport users 
Committee to express its opinion on air 
fares and related matters for which purpose 
the members of the Committee shall be 
supplied with an appropriate information. 
This Committee shall in each Member State 
include the main consumers' interests 
concerned with matters of this kind. If 
no such Committee exists, the state 
concerned shall set one up. 
' ' 
1. At least once a year, the Commission will 
consult the Federation of Air Transport Users 
Representatives in the EEC <FATUREC) as well as 
any other interested organisations to express 
its opinion on air fares and related matters for 
which purpose the meMbers of FATUREC shall be 
supplied with appropriate infor•ation. 
2. The ComMission shall convene FATUREC a. 
regular intervals, at least once a year, for an 
exchange of views at Community level. 
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2. The Commission shall convene periodically, 
at least once a year, representatives of the 
transport users committees referred to in 
paragraph 1, for an exchange of views at 
Communrity level. 
1. ~he Commission shall every second year after 
the 1st of January, 1983, publish a report on the 
scheduled air tariffs to which this directive 
applies. 
2. F.or the purposes of this report, the Member 
States shall inform the Commission of all such 
air tariffs filed with them and of any instance 
when article 6 has been invoked during the 
relevant period, and, at the request of the 
Commission, provide details with respect to 
the conformity of the procedures actually 
adopted by Member States with the provisions 
of this directive and the conformity of 
such air tariffs with the criteria in 
article 3. 
3. Before issuing the report, the Commission 
shall as it thinks fit consult with the 
representatives of the Air Transport Users 
Committees, airlines, governments, and 
other interested parties. 
4. Confidential information obtained by 
the application of this directive is 
covened by the professional secrecy. 
- 15 -
Deleted 
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Air tariffs being applied at the entry 
into force of this directive remain 
valid until replaced by other air 
tariffs. 
Where a Member State has concluded an 
agreement with one or more third 
countries, which gives fifth freedom 
ri(:ts for a route between Member 
States to an air carrier of a third 
country and in this respect contains 
provisions incompatible with this 
Directive, the Member State shall 
take at the first opportunity all 
appropriate steps to eLiminate 
such incompatibilities. Until such 
time as the incompatibilities have 
been eliminated this directive 
shall not affect the rights and 
obligations vis-a-vis third 
countries arising from such an 
agreement. 
1. The Member State shall, before 
1 January 1983, and after consultation 
with the Commission, take the necessary 
steps to amend their laws and administrative 
provisions to comply with this directive. 
- 16 -
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(Unchanged> 
!!!i~!!J __ 
<Unchanged> 
1. The MeMber State shall, before 
1 January 1984, and after consultation 
with the Commission, take the necessary 
steps to amend their laws and 
administrative provisions to comply 
with this directive. 
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··~,.. ,• ' 
2. Such measures shall cover, inter alia, 
the organisation of, procedures for and 
means of control, and the penalties for 
aoy breach. 
3. The Member States shall communicate 
to the Commission all laws and 
administrative provisions made in 
furtherance of this directive. 
This directive is addressed to the Member States 
- 17 -
<Unchanged) 
<Unchanged> 
A.t1i.tl1-11 
<unehanveo> 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
closing the procedure for consultation of the European Parliament on 
the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the 
Council for a Directive <EEC> on tariffs for scheduled air transport 
between Member States 
The European Parliament 
having regard to the proposal from the Commission to the Council 
<COM (81) 590 final) (1); 
having been consulted by the Council (Doe. 1-740/81>; 
having regard to the Commission's report on 'Scheduled passenger air 
fares in the EEC' <COM (81> 398 final>; 
recalling its previous resolutions on the air transport sector and 
. . l" (2) on compet1t1on po 1cy ; 
having regard to the second report of the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary ~ffairs and of the opinion of the Committee on Transport; 
< ooc. 1-454/83/ rev.);. 
having regard to the result of the vote on the proposal from the 
Commission. 
General observations 
1. Believes that various studies carried out recently (3), including that of 
th C . . (4) h "d "f" d b f . . d" e omm1ss1on , ave 1 ent1 1e a num er o 1mportant 1ssues regar 1ng 
(1) OJ No. C 78, 30.3.1982, p. 6 
(2) OJ No. C 291, 10.11.1980, OJ No. C 11, 18.1.1982, p. 72 
<3> e.g. AUC, CAA, TAI and ECAC studies referred to in the Annex of the 
report 
(4) COM (81) 398 final PE 84.317/fin./II/rev. 
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the Level of air fares within the Community which deserve closer 
examination: 
the considerable discrepancy between fares within the Community and 
those prevailing in certain other markets, notably within and to the 
United States: 
the appa·rent differentials in levels of productivity and of efficiency 
between European airlines as a whole and their American counterparts, 
and also between scheduled and non-scheduled airlines; 
the lack of transparency on a number of questions central to any 
proper evaluation of fare levels, such as the degree of cross-
subsidization between regions of the world, between routes and also 
between different fare categories, the effects of prorating, and 
the degree of government assistance to airlines; 
the related need for the travelling public to have a clearer 
understanding of what it is paying for; 
the apparently very high level of profits on certain selected routes, 
particularly certain longer-haul ones; 
the time consuming nature of present tariff setting procedures; 
the need for greater opportunity to be given to airline initiatives 
in intra-Community traffic, both with respect to products offered on 
a route, and market entry; 
2. Points out, moreover, that the existing system of multiple bilateral 
approvals of air fares put forward by national carriers, results in 
practice, in prices being set by the national carrier of the country 
with the most restrictive system, in circumstances where the costs 
involved are not apparent, and where there is little or no chance for 
a third party competitor to offer different terms; 
- 19 -
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3. calls again, therefore, for greater transparency and for gradual 
liberalization in the air transport sector of the Community; 
4. warns, however, against simplistic comparisons being made between the 
levels of air fares within the Community and those prevailing elsewhere, 
especially the United States. Notes the great differences between the 
respective markets. Further notes the very different circumstances of 
national carriers, with large, and often world-wide networks and imposed 
public service obligations, and smaller private carriers; 
5. Points out that the above considerations are not justifications for 
inaction, but illustrate the need for care in moving towards a better 
system, which would help meet some of the problems outlined above while 
still preserving beneficial features of the present system; 
The Commission's Proposal 
6. Welcomes the Commission's proposal on scheduled air fares as a limited 
but useful step; 
7. Strongly supports the thrust of Article 3 that air fares should be more 
closely related to costs; 
8. Supports the principle that disputes between Member States should be 
referred to arbitration. Believes, that in due course this type of 
procedure could also be applicable to disputes over questions of market 
access; 
Complementary measures 
9. Urges the Commission to follow through vigorously on the overall strategy 
it set out in its memorandum on 'Air Transport: A Community approach', 
and to take into account the views of the European Parliament in favour of 
a measured and gradual evolution safeguarding the interests of the public, 
the airlines and their employees and avoiding disruption of services 
to the less developed regions of the Community; 
- 20 -
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10. Calls on the Commission to submit to Parliament, having regard to the 
resolution adopted by Parliament on 9.3.1982 on the basis of the report 
by Mr. Carossino (Doe. 1-996/81>, a proposal for an air transport policy 
that would allow the following measures, amongst others, to be taken: 
swift adoption of the proposed regulation applying Articles 85 
and 86 to Air transport as re~sted by Parliament in its recent 
l 
. (1) 
reso ut1on ; 
further tackling of the central problem of greater market access, 
without which.the possibilities for lowering air fares are limited; 
further examination of the ide~s recently put forward by the task 
force on competition in intra-European air services <COMPAS> 
established by the European Civil Aviation Conference <ECAC) and, 
in particular -the concept of zones of freedom to compete/safety nets 
for tariffs, route entry ao4 capacity recommended for further study 
by the task force; 
extension of the scope,of the Commission's directive on the 
transparency of financial reletions between Member States and their 
public undertakings to include the presently excluded transport 
sector as well; 
vigorous action to ensure greater transparency of state aids to air 
transport and the establishment of Community guidelines as to when 
such aids are justified and when not; 
greater coordination between the aviation authorities in the various 
Member States aimed at minimizing the costs of en-route and landing 
charges, and of infrastructure, and in improvi,ng coordination of 
air traffic control, and the harmonization of technical standards 
for aircraft; 
completion of a proper customs union within the Community, in order to 
(1) Motion for a resolution on the regulation applying Articles 85 and 
86 of the EEC Treaty to air transport, OJ No. 
- 21 -
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reduce unnecessary formalities and radically cut the costs of intra-
Community travel; 
11. Believes, however, that in the longer term, a European ca.aunity Civil 
Aviation Authority should be established. 
~oints out that this could be started off on a limited scale by building 
up a permanent centre of expertise on air transport matters at Community 
level and that it could undertake some of the studies needed in the field 
of air transport. Believes that even~uJlly it could tackle a much wi~er 
range of responsibilities, and perhaps suc;h Matters as a Community-wide 
pilot's licence, crew conditions, air worthiness and so on. 
Considers that this would represent the best course of action in CQM~Unity 
terms, in providing the. basis for an eventual Community-wide fraaewor.k, 
and in enabling the Coamunity to dev9~0Q an aviation and airline indyftry 
of truly European s~ale. 
12. Instructs its Preside.nt to forward to the Counci-l and COMission, as 
Parliaaent•s opinion, the CoMMi$sion's proposal as voted by Parliaaent 
and the corresponding resolution. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Foreword to the revised report 
1. On 17 December 1982 the report (Doe. 1-847/82) drawn up by the Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the Commission's proposed Directive 
on tariffs for scheduled air transport between Member States was 
considered at the plenary session of Parliament. 
2. At the conclusion of voting on the amendments to the proposed directive 
3. 
it was clear that the amenaments that hati been approved did not for~ a 
coherent whole. Parliament decided then to-·refer-the iSStie-ie-c·IC:·to.-·the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, before ·any final vote on ·either 
the text of the proposed di rect·ive as a whole, or on th-e' prnr»n's~ 
motion for·a resolution. 
The rapporteur 
by Parliament and 
carefully examined the amendments that were approved 
sought to produce a new text following the broad 
lines of these amendments, but avoiding certain contradictions and overlaps 
that were created. 
4. The major change proposed by the rapporteur lay in Article 6. The 
combined effect of Parliament's votes on December 17, 1982 <and in 
particular its approval of amendments PE 81.798, Am. 40, PE 81.798 
Am. 30 and PE 81.798, Am. 7> was to propose two different systems of 
arbitration in the case of disputes between the two Member States concerned. 
5. The text proposed by the rapporteur in her new Article 6 put · 
forward one clear rather than two overlapping systems of arbitration in 
case of dispute, while containing certain elements from both proposals • 
. . 
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6. The other changes proposed by the rapporteur in her new text as compared 
to the text resulting from the amendm,nts produced by parliament are 
contained in Article 3 where she suggests that the original words 
"that the airlines concerned are in a position to offer air tariffs that" 
be replaced by "that the airlines concerned offer air tariffs that", 
in Article 5 where she suggests that the word "established" in line 2 
be replaced by the word "proposed", and in Article 8 where the word 
"Committee" in the last line is replaced by "FATUREC" in order to ensure 
consistency with the rest of the Article. 
7. A number of other changes compared to the Commission's original text were put 
forward as a result of the vote in the Parliament's December plenary were 
retained by the rapporteur; 
in Article 2 the definition of air carrier ~as considerably 
modified; 
in Article 3, 1 <a> the word .. costs" was preceded by the word 
"overall" and the word "efficient" before air carrier 
deleted. Article 3, 1 <b) conti-ined· a second sentence referring to the 
need to make social or other subsid1es,transparent. Article 3, 
paragraph 2 was made more sweeping; 
in Article 4 tne scope for inter-airline consultations wa& made 
much broader, and not just limited to interlining or the standardisation 
of conditions associated with air tariffs; 
in Article 7 the reference to individual national Air transport 
users committees· was . deleted, and reference made instead to 
cons~ltation with the Federation of Air Transport User Representatives 
<FATUREC>, whcih has been established since the Commission's original 
proposals 
--
the old Article 8, in the Commission's original proposal which would 
have established a report on the scheduled air tariffs to which the 
directive applied, and would have required the Member States to 
inform the Commission of all such air tariffs filed with them, 
was. deleted, as a result of the vote at the December plenary. 
~. 
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8. As a result of the vote in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
on 15 June 1983, most of the abov• c~anges were retained but a few additional 
modifications were made. 
The definition of an air carrier in Article 2{b) was further modified by 
replacing the word "and" in line 7 by the word "or". 
In article 3<b> a reference was added to "direct operating" costs and the 
Commission was requested additionally to determine whether any subsidy could 
be justified within the terms of Article 92(3) of the Treaty. 
In Article 4 the terms for inter-airline consultations have been spelled out 
in more detail, with representatives of governments and the Commission being 
"fully entitled" to take part in such consultations and with the Commission 
being asked to certify whether a consultation is generally in accord with the 
provisions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. 
In Article 5 certain textual MOdifications have been made. 
Ar.ticle 6 has also been further modified, although the system of arbitration 
proposed by the rapporteur has not been changed in its essentials. 
In Article 7 a reference has been added to consultations with other interested 
organisations. 
i - --
9. As regards the proposed motion for a resolution the rapporteur has made 
the corresponding modifications to those paragraphs (the old 6 to 13) 
concerned with the Commission's proposal by deleting or modifying them 
in order to ensure that they are in conformity with her proposals 
concerning the directive. 
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10. In the section on general observations.the rapporteur has also deleted 
the old fifth indent to her paragraph 1 which referred to the exceptionally 
high costs of certain costs in Europe, such as en-route and landing charges, 
and she has also modified the indent on the same subject in paragraph 10 
(paragraph 16 in her old text) where she has removed the reference to 
"tackling the soaring costs of en-route and landing charges ••• " and 
now speaks instead of minimizing such costs without wishing to enter 
here into a detailed discussion of the nature of aeronautical fees and 
costs. 
The rappor~·eur would like to acknowledge in this context fhe 
comments transmitted to her by: various-·nattonaf ·e-uropeln.~airpo.r't.liut'h.or-ft·i-es in 
which they challenged aspects of the methodology and conclusions of the 
TAl study and of the report of the European Commission CCOM (81> 398). 
-As-,-however, the -'issue --oflandin·g charges~~i s· aarg~nal. to .. ih·e, 1118-in -stitle=~t:· other 
report, the rapporteur feels that it would not be appropriate for her to 
enter into the debate between the Commission and the ai·rport authorities. 
'· .. 
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... 
Introduction 
11. The level of intra European air fares has been the subject of con-
siderable controversy over the last few years, and highly unfavourable 
comparisons have been made in particular with fares charged over similar 
distances within the United States. Others claim that these comparisons 
are unfair and that there are a wide range of factors which help to 
justify the differences in prices. 
12. A number of reports have sought to examine the issue of European air 
fares in greater detail. The Commission itself prepared a report on 
scheduled passenger air fares in the EEC <COM(81) 398 fin.) in July 1981, 
·following which in October 1981 it put forward a proposal for a Council 
directive on tariffs for scheduled air transport between Member States 
(COM<81) 590 fin.) in order to help tackle some of the problems that it 
had identified. 
13. Parliament has on several occasions urged for a greater liberalization of 
the air transport sector within the Community, and for greater com-
petition, albeit with the necessary safeguards, and with due attention 
being taken of the special characteristics of the European market. It 
is in this spirit that your rapporteur has examined the Commission's 
specific proposals on air fares. 
14. This report briefly examines the main conclusions of the various studies 
carried out on the issue of air fares, and that of the Commission in 
particular. It then reviews the Commission's proposals. The report 
concludes by broadly supporting the Commission's proposals but with a 
number of suggested amendments. It further points out that the proposals 
are a useful but nevertheless still limited step forward, and considers 
that they need to be complemented by a number of other measures at Community 
level if the wider goals outlined by Parliament in its previous resolutions 
are to be achieved. 
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St~dies concerning European air fares 
15. As mentioned above a number of studies have been carried out in recent 
years on the subject of European air fares. Among those that have been 
examined by your rapporteur are that of the Air Transport Users Committee 
CAUC) of the United Kingdom of December 1976 (followed up by a further 
study in 1980), the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority CCAA) study 
on European Air Fares of November 1977, the TAl study carried out for the 
Commission in October 1980 not directly on air fares but on the related 
issue of the economic cost structure of air transport in Europe, the European 
Civil Aviation Conference CECAC) report on intra-European scheduled air 
fares. Some of the major conclusions from these various studies are 
summarized in Annex to this report. 
The Commission's Report on "Scheduled Passenger Air Fares in the EEC" 
CCOMC81) 398 final) 
16. The Commission's Repo.rt, which took into account the studies mentioned 
above, as well as a number of other studies and submissions, was issued 
in July 1981 • It examined the ways in which scheduled passenger air 
fares are fixed, and the criteria used to evaluate the level of such fares, 
both by the national administrations concerned, and by various affected 
organisations. It then looked at Community air fares in terms of the 
profitability of the Community network, the structure of fares, the relation-
ship of fares to the costs of operation, and the level of costs. It then 
drew a number of conclusions to help serve as an initial basis for Community 
policy formulation in this area. 
17. Among the most significant of these conclusions were that: 
-While the profitability per world region is rather sensitive to the 
way costs are allocated, recent studies give no evidence of excessive 
earninQs in the EEC overall, and that in fact the overall profit of 
scheduled airlines operations in the EEC leave much to be desired. 
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-There is a wide range of profitability between individual routes, 
implying that some routes are cross-subsidised by others. This is 
generally acceptable in the view of the Commission but only to the 
extent that each route should at least cover the incremental costs of 
operating that route, and that the number of routes that do not fully 
cover the total costs of operation should be strictly limited. Few 
governments, or airlines however, reveal the information which is 
necessary to decide whether individual air fares are reasonably 
related to costs. 
- More specifically, the Commission finds that the relationship between 
the normal economy fare and the costs on shorter routes seems to be 
quite reasonable but that the margin of profits increases considerably 
on longer distances. The Commission finds similar fares over similar 
distances desirable to some extent, but feels that important differences 
in the costs of operation between airlines and/or routes should also be 
reflected in the respective tariffs; 
-The Commission also concludes, guardedly, (p.51>, ''that on some routes 
the level of profits may be so high that the question of their com-
parability with Article 86 arises"; 
- As regards the contentious issue of the relative efficiency of scheduled 
compared to non-scheduled airlines, the Commission concludes that 
"cascade" studies show that the difference in efficiency would not 
appear to be enormous, but do nevertheless exist to an extent which may 
be as Low as 5% and as high as 25% depending on the assumptions made; 
The Commission also believes that there are a few areas where cost 
reductions or at Least cost control should be possible, such as in 
high government charges for the use of infrastructure. There are other 
areas where the airlines themselves have more discretion, such as the 
high Level of European sales costs, and changes in the products which 
airlines are offering to passengers, perhaps by eliminating some of 
the services included in many of the present fares, which passengers 
do not always require. 
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- In the context of products offered, the Commission considers that 
the present fare structure is too much a result of the interest 
of the a1rlines, and that there are many routes where consumers 
choice is too l1mited. The Commission believes (para. 130, ~.54) 
that "as long as the airlines are protected both with regard to 
market access and prices, airlines should also offer at least one 
~dled lo~ fare o~ each route they operate, in addition to an 
economy type fare, which l~ based on point-to-point transporta-
tion costs with an option of buy1ng a reservation": 
- Transparency should also be improved and the travelling public 
should be able to have a clearer understanding of what it is 
paying for, and in particular be able to see what price it needs 
to pay in order to obtain greater travelling flexibility: 
- With regard to the process of tariff setting itself, the 
Commission feels that current procedures are rather time consuming 
and that one of the fields for future action for the European 
Community should be to achieve a less rigid tariff setting pro-
cedure for intra-Community air travel: 
- Finally, although the report does not deal directly with issues 
of market access and competition, the Commission believes that 
its previous view has been reinforced that (point 133, p. 55) 
"more opportunities should be given to airline init1atives in 
intra-Ccmmunity traffic, both with respect to products offered 
on a route and market entry". 
Is there an air fares "problem"? 
18. From the evidence above, (and in the Annex) and as a result of wide 
consultations with interested parties, your. rapporteur is convinced 
that no simplistic conclusions are possible. 
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19. It 1s clearly unfa1r to tak~ an internal flight within the United 
States and compare the fare "d th a flight over a comparab.le dis-
tance between different Community Member States, and then to jump 
to hasty conclusions. The differing structures of demand between 
the two areas, the shorter distances in Europe, and the greater 
availability of other forms of transport, the greater number of 
charter flights in Europe - the differing ways in which ancillary 
airline and infrastructure charges are me~ and above all 
that flights within Europe are "international" with all the 
implications entailed, even including for airport design, are 
among the many factors that prevent straightforward comparisons 
being possible. In a fundamental sense, as your rapporteur seeks 
to outline in rather more detail at the end of this report, a 
central reason for the failure of European air fares to be lower 
is the wider failure of the Community itself to achieve greater 
cohesion and to build a true internal market. 
20. Another factor which makes judgements about air fare levels dif-
ficult is the great d1fference between infividual airlines and, 
1n particular, between those often indepenc.ient ones which operate a 
small number of well travelled routes and those which have to 
operate large networks, often worldwide, and, which, moreover, 
often incl~de less travelled rou~es maintained for public service 
reasons. Besides having ~o maintain uneconomic routes, being a 
national carr1er often also entails other obligations imposed by 
the sponsoring state, such as the maintenance of employment and 
conditions of service at levels not necessarily incumbent on 
independent a1rl1nes. 
21. A further d1:ficult 1ssue is t~e definition of consumer interest. 
It is clear that there 1s no one consumer interest to protect. 
The businessman whose major criteria are likely to be frequency 
of service and max1mu~ flexib1l1ty is a very different consumer 
to the le1sure traveller for whom low cost is more likely to be 
paramount. A user who lives in a major capital and wishes to 
travt-1 to anntt.cr suet·. cap1tal city has a d1fferent interest from 
a us~r frum a ~cr1pheral rcg1on for whom the economics of being 
provided w1tt. a regula~ service to or from his region may only be 
marg1r.al at hc;.;t. 
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1?. Furthermore, your rapporteur has seen no convincing estimates of 
the Likely impacts of Lowering European air fares on the structure 
of air transport in Europe- and, in particular, the extent to 
which there might be pent-up demand that has not yet been met. 
23. The issue of air fares is hard to separate from the wider issues 
posed by air transport Liberalisation and the emotive 
concept of deregulation, which is of course as much related to 
questions of market access as to level of fares. In this context 
1t is not possible to draw instant conclusions from the American 
exp~r1ence w1th deregulat1on. It is still too early to judge 
fa1rly, and both potent1ally positive and nega~ive features are 
emerg1ng. Your rapporteur would firmly underline, however, that 
those who are wr1t1ng off deregulation on the basis of recent 
tre~6s 1n ~he 12dustry, in particular the high losses being made 
cy ~any a1rl1nes, 3re doing so prematurely, and secondly, that the 
sceptre of total deregulation and uncontrolled competition should 
not be put forward to block more modesc moves towards liberalisatio~ 
24. So, 1f no Slmpl1st1c conclus1ons can be drawn, what should be done 
at c~~~unity level? Your rapporteur feels t~at wh1le the 
ev1dence concerning the establishment of lower levels of air 
fares ·"'ithin the c.)mmun1ty naay be inconclusive, i:he existing status 
quo does need to be subject to much greater scrutiny. 
25. Issues such as the 3llocation of costs between regions and routes, 
the degree of cross-subsidisation, the implications of inter-
lin ing and prorat1on, and the exact nature of the services pro-
Vlded by airl1nes, a~e all matters which affect air fare levels, 
and which are technical matters not susceptible to facile judge-
~ents by outs1ders. Nevertheless, in the absence of effective 
competition 1n the sector, the national carriers do need to be 
kept on the1r toes, and the above 1ssues more carefully analysed. 
26. The ex1sting system of multiple bilateral approvals of air fares 
put forward by national carriers generally operating in a rtalepOly situation 
resu:ts,ln practice, in pr1ces be1ng set by the national carrier 
of the country w1th ~he most restrict1ve system, in circumstances 
wnere the costs involved are not apparent, and where there 1s no 
chance for a third party compet1tor to offer different terms. 
Greater transparency, and some degree of liberalisation are thus 
~ssent1al. T~e CommLSsLon's proposal on air fares does represent 
a caut1ous step 1n these two d1rect1ons. 
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Comments on the Commission's proposal for a directive (COM(81) 590 final) 
27. The Commission's proposal for a Council directive on tariffs for scheduled 
air transport between Member States represents a limited response to some 
of the problems identified in the Commission's report as outlined above. 
While generally welcoming the Commission's proposal your rapporteur has a 
number of comments on specific articles. 
Article 3 
2~. Article 3 mentions a number of criteria for the evaluation of air tariffs 
by the state concerned, the key one being that they should take all appro-
priate measures to ensure that air tariffs " ••• are reasonably related 
to the costs of an efficient air carrier ••• ". The second paragraph of 
this article, however, would permit an air carrier to match an existing 
tariff approved for another airline for the same route with the same 
originating point, even if the criteria mentioned in paragraph 1 of the 
article were not met. 
29. The basic thrust behind this article, that air tariffs should be more 
closely related to costs, is worthy of strong support. 
30. Nevertheless your rapporteur does have certain reservations about this 
article. The concept of an "efficient" airline, for instance, as 
laid down in paragraph 1(a) of the article, is an extremely difficult one 
to define in any objective way. While it is clear that certain state-run 
or sponsored airlines are over-staffed and have a number of highly in-
efficient practices, it is nevertheless difficult to compare the efficiency 
of a state airline, which must often fulfil non-commercial objectives, 
with that of a private airline operating one one or two well-travelled 
routes. As regards these state airlines, and without much greater 
transparency of the relations between them and their sponsoring government, 
it is going to be very hard to judge which such airlines are efficient 
given the constraints within which they operate, and which instead, are 
genuinely inefficient. Even as regards private airlines efficiency will 
not be easy to judge. Over what time period should an assessment be 
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made, for instance, and which criteria should be used? To cite a highly 
topical example Laker Airways were very efficient according to certain 
criteria, with great consequent benefits to consumers as a whole, but 
much less efficient according to other criteria, to the immediate financial 
loss of certain selected passengers. While sympathizing then, with the 
Commission's inclusion of the word ''efficient'', your rapporteur wonders 
whether it would not be more realistic to have it deleted from the draft 
text. 
31. A second reservation concerns relating costs too closely to individual 
routes. Certainly the current situation is insufficiently transparent. 
The degree of cross-subsidization and the effects of prorating are not 
revealed to any extent. Furthermore, the evidence would seem to indicate 
that certain longer-haul routes in particular, may well be overpriced. 
The ECAC study referred to in the Annex claimed that route costs could be 
identified with a reasonable degree of accuracy, but others have indicated 
that problems of allocating overheads between routes within the Community 
and those extending to other parts of the world makes this impossible. 
Nevertheless too great an emphasis on the costs of individual routes might 
also be a mistake, and some degree of cross-subsidization would appear to 
be inevitable, for instance to help cover the costs of services to certain 
remote regions. Moreover the existence of certain loss leaders is normal 
commercial practice in most businesses. It should also be possible to 
permit a flexible commercial response in air transport as well. 
32. Finally paragraph 2 of Article 3 would permit any air carrier to match an 
existing tariff. This means that the principle established in paragraph 1 
of relating air tariffs to costs could be undercut. 
Article 4 
33. Article 4 seeks to restrict the ability of airlines to get together and 
have consultations on the establishment of air tariffs. In paragraph 4(b) 
consultations between airlines are only expressly authorised in two cases 
fixing the terms of interlining and simplifying and standardising conditions 
associated with air tariffs. 
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34. Your rapporteur has certain reservations about 4(b). Evidence has been 
submitted arguing that there should be a wider scope for inter-airline 
consultations than would be permitted under the terms of this article. 
These arguments would appear to have a certain amount of validity, 
always on the proviso, however, that representatives not just of the 
Member States but also of the Commission do indeed participate at such 
consultations, in order that potential abuses may be detected. Your 
rapporteur has consequently suggested an addition to the existing text 
proposed by the Commission. 
Article 6 
35. Article 6 puts forward two highly controversial concepts, arbitration 
by the Commission and state of origin approval unless vetoed by the Com-
mission. These would create a derogation from the existing pattern of 
tariff approval whereby both states concerned have to agree on a tariff, 
by providing for the state of origin to approve a proposed air tariff 
unilaterally if disagreement between the two states still persists after 
a certain time limit, unless the second state asks the Commission to 
arbitrate. The Commission would have to take a decision within 30 
working days of the date of referral. In the absence of a decision 
within 30 working days, the air tariff would come into effect "until 
such date as the decision of the Commission comes into force". 
36. This is the core of the Commission's proposal. Of the two principal 
elements that it contains your rapporteur strongly supports the country 
of origin principle, as a useful if limited step forward. It would give 
a country which puts a priority on lower air fares the opportunity to 
allow a certain progress towards this goal. It means that air fares 
would no longer be pegged to quite the same extent to the levels desired 
by the more restrictive carrier. It could even put pressure on those 
countries with more restrictive systems to examine more rigorously the 
fare levels of their own carriers. If not, however, there is no reason 
why discrepancies between the one-way fares in each direction should not 
be allowed to persist, and in fact such discrepancies have already 
existed in the past as a result of exchange rate differences. 
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37. The second key item in Article 6 concerns Commission arbitration. 
Your rapporteur is not opposed to this concept, ·but recognizes the very 
real resistance that could be encountered on sovereignty and other grounds. 
38. Your rapporteur has considered two alternatives to the Commission's pro-
posal. One would be to form an Air Tariffs Committee consisting of 
representatives of Member States and presided over by a representative of 
the Commission, which could be convened when necessary. Within the Com-
mittee the votes of Member States would be weighted in accordance with 
Article 148<2> of the treaty. Such a solution could reduce the 
sovereignty problem that might be seen to be posed by Commission 
arbitration, would not be costly, and yet could not have the charge of 
lack of expertise levelled at it. 
39. The second alternative would be to establish an embryonic European Civil 
Aviation Authority - starting off on a limited scale by building up a 
permanent centre of expertise on air transport matters and could carry 
out some of the further studies needed in the field of air transport. 
In the long run it could tackle a much wider range of responsibilities, 
and perhaps such matters as a Community-wide pilot's licence, crew con-
ditions, air worthiness, etc. This solution would provoke a strong 
reaction from entrenched national bureaucracies, but your rapporteur feels 
that it might be the best course of action in the long term when it is 
hoped that the Community may have an a~ation and airline industry based 
on a coherent market equivalent in some respects to the current American 
market which dominates the world scene. 
Article 7 
40. Article 7 calls for the establishment of Air Transport Users Committee 
in each Member State when they do not already exist, and for them to be 
consulted on air fares and related matters. These committees have now 
been formed in most Member States within FATUREC. 
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Opinion of the Committee on Transport1 
41. Your rapporteur is therefore in favour of the Commission's directive 
subject to a number of modifications to the existing text. She notes, 
however, that the opinion of the Committee on Transport adopts instead 
a hostile attitude, although a substantial minority of the committee 
dissociated themselves from the opinion and welcomed the Commission's 
proposed directive. 
The opinion criticises the Directive on the grounds that it is "unilateral" 
and allows introduction of tariffs on the basis of approval by the country 
of origin. Your rapporteur suggests that this is an overstatement and 
that it is based on an incorrect reading of Article 6. This quite 
clearly states that if there is disagreement the Commission can be asked 
to arbitrate and the State of Origin can be over-ruled. The 
opinion also asks for the interline system to be facilitated and your 
rapporteur has proposed an amendment to Article 4 in order to permit the 
widest possible discussion between airlines. It should however, be 
remembered that the provision of interlining is costly and that some air-
line users might prefer to have some less expensive tickets available that 
do not include this benefit. 
The opinion's main recommendation is that developments on the North 
Atlantic Route and in ECAC should be monitored to see how the "zones of 
reasonableness" concept develops in practice and that the Commission 
should withdraw its proposed Directive for at least a year or two so this 
can be done. A recent ECAC Task Force has concluded that a bilateral 
approach to "zones of reasonableness" is the only feasible one and it is 
understood that the ECAC-USA experimental scheme is based on a bilateral 
approach within a multilateral framework. There is nothing in the 
Directive to prevent experiment with zones of reasonableness on a route 
between Member States under a bilateral arrangement. 
1PE 77.117/fin., draftsman: Mr KEY PE 84.317/fin./II/rev. 
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Your rapporteur can therefore see no reason why the Directive should be 
delayed. She would welcome experiment with zones of reasonableness 
within the Community and feels this would be far more useful than data 
derived from the North Atlantic Routes. There the concept is being 
used to enable an increase in fares, and the position is very different 
from the complex system of short haul routes within the Community. Zones 
of reasonableness have as their reference point fares set by existing 
route operators. The concept cannot therefore offer the scope for 
innovation and gradual development which the Directive provides. 
'Final Observations 
42. Subject to the above comments your rapporteur recommends Parliament sup-
port for the Commission's proposals. Nevertheless it is clear that this 
proposal is not enough in itself, but needs to be complemented by a number 
of other measures. The Commission has already outlined a broad strategy 
in its memorandum "Air Transport: A Community Approach". 
that such a broad strategy be maintained. 
It is essential 
43. Parliament has on several occasions called for Community competition 
policy to be extended to the air transport sector although in a gradual 
and judicious way. The Commission's proposed Council regulation applying 
Articles 85 and 86 to air transport CCOMC81 396 fin.) is therefore an 
important complementary measure, and has indeed been recently supported by 
the Parliament1• Greater competition in the sector will eventually have 
a greater effect on the level of air fares than the Commission's current 
proposal, which leaves untouched the central issue of market access. 
Without greater possibilities for such market access the possibilities for 
lowering air fares are limited, and your rapporteur suggests a first step 
in this direction by amending the definition of Air Carrier and by also 
proposing that the Air Tariffs Committee might eventually consider 
question of access. 
1Resolution 
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44. A key related need outlined in this report has been the need for much 
greater transparency. Parliament has, in a previously adopted resolu-
tion1 already urged "the Commission to institute a system of full trans-
parency of airline finances and statistics, especially with regard to 
route profitability." An essential step in this regard is to extend the 
scope of the Commission's directive on the transparency of financial 
relations between Member States and their public undertakings to include 
the previously excluded transport sector as well. 
45. The Commission must also push harder with regard to the control of State 
aids. The Commission has issued a recent working paper on this issue in 
which it points out <P.3) "that in the case of the air transport sector 
there has been an almost total failure by the Member States to comply with 
the obligation to notify state aids." The paper does go on to point out, 
however, some of the distortions which are apparently being caused by 
certain aids. For instance in one Member State aircraft registered in 
that state pay lower airport charges than aircraft registered elsewhere. 
In others annual subsidies to cover losses on scheduled services are pro-
vided. Many aids do have valuable public policy purpose. Others do 
not. There is a clear need for Commission action in this field in laying 
down guidelines for the provision of state aids in the air transport sector. 
State aids and subsidies to protect services for social reasons for 
instance to remoter regions and communities have a strong justification 
not least to promote the important Community objective of reducing economic 
disparities between richer and poorer countries and regions. Nevertheless 
your rapporteur believes strong(y that such aid should not be hidden but 
should be made as transparent as possible. 
46. Besides competition policy a further area for action has been mentioned 
on several occasions by those giving eyidence to your rapporteur. If 
there could be some limits to the growth of certain government-controlled 
cost factors there could be a considerable impact on levels of air fares, 
an~ in particular the cost of landing and en-route charges should be 
kept to a minimum. It was submitted to your rapporteur that these 
charges are roughly 5 times as high in Europe as in the United States, 
and represent more than 11% of the total European costs against only 4% 
in the US. 
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47. A trther striking figure is the much greater extent to which circuitous 
routes have to be adopted in Europe due to national defence and other 
factors compared to in the United States. It has been calculated that 
15% excess distances are flown in Europe. compared to only 3% in the US. 
48. The need for much greater coordination of air traffic control within the 
Community is also clear. 
49. All these factors indicate the need for much broader cooperation at Euro-
pean level in the area of air transport, and also helps to illustrate 
the perhaps longer-term case for the establishment of some form of Euro-
pean civil aviation authority as suggested in paragraph 39 above. 
I 
50. There is no question that there needs to be some sort of overall framework 
for regulation of the air transport sector within the Community, avoiding 
complete deregulation at one end of the spectrum, which is politically 
and practically infeasible, and an over-dirigiste approach at the other. 
51. Short of deregulation, for instance, but nevertheless a step towards 
greater flexibility, would be the approach pioneered by the American Civil 
Aviation Board before full deregulation was introduced, of establishing 
l 
zones of reasonableness for air fares. In the version introduced by the 
CAB in September 1978, companies were permitted to set fares as much as 
10 percent above and 50 percent below a set formula fare determined by 
the regulatory authority without prior CAB approval. Your rapporteur has 
indicated that this might be a useful approach in her comments on the 
I 
Transport Committee's opinion in paragraph 41 above. Of potentially even 
greater interest are the proposals put forward by the task force on Com-
~ 
petition in intra-European air services (COMPAS) established by the Euro-
pean Civil Aviation Conference <ECAC). In their recent report <COMPAS 
r~port - May 1982) they called for close examination of zones of freedom 
to compete/safety nets not just for tariffs, but also for route entry and 
capacity as well. For existing routes existing carriers would be per-
mitted to mount additional capacity and additional carriers to introduce 
I 
capacity, and for route creation, any existing or new carrier would be 
permitted to create an additional route, provided, in both cases, that 
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certain basic criteria were met. The report concluded <summary -
paragraph 37(c) and (d)) "if these zones/safety nets were adopted, the 
regulation of airlines by governments would become more flexible, and 
the airlines' freedom to compete would increase but, in both cases, the 
changes would be evolutionary rather than revolutionary". "It there-
fore believes that ECAC should develop a recommendation with regard to 
these three zone/safety net systems even if only on an experimental basis". 
Your rapporteur endorses these conclusions. 
52. Another issue which will need to be examined is the inter-relationship 
of charter and scheduled services. 
53. In another context steps could also be taken to encourage joint ventures 
between existing carriers, or even mergers. It is ironic that the last 
real attempts to establish a Community-wide airline were over 20 years 
ago. 
54. One final comment is an even wider one, previously referred to in para-
graph 9 above, namely that one important contributory reason for the high 
level of air fares within the Community is the wider failure of the Corn-
munity itself to build a proper internal market. The achievement of the 
customs union would have a major effect on simplifying the design of air-
ports. If there were effective controls at the external borders of the 
Community and less at the internal borders far less people would have to 
be channelled through one central point in the airport. The TAl study 
cited in the above (and described in more detail in the Annex) underlined 
this general point forcefully (on page 17 of the summary) when it states: 
"Why cannot a flight from Brussels to London be made procedurally as 
simple as a train journey from Brussels to Paris?" The impact on costs 
could be great. 
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ANNEX 
Further details concerning recent air fares studies 
The study published by the British Air Transport Users Committee in 
December 19761, and followed up by another study in 1980, was a highly 
critical one, its main conclusion being that normal economy fares were 
too high and were subsidizing virtually all other fares. It further 
pointed out that first class fares were too low, and also criticized 
the results of prorating which it claimed "gave travellers outside. 
Europe, and in particular from North America, an unmerited reduction 
in the fares they paid." Another point strongly underlined by the 
AUC was the absence of proper cost data for European airlines, in 
comparison to the situation in the United States where carriers have 
to file both detailed costs and detailed operation figures. 
Among the conclusions of the 1980 study was that almost all European 
normal fares were higher than the fares for similar length journeys 
in North America and Australia, that on the basis of cost per mile 
there was substantial and widespread geographical discrimination, 
and that there were numerous examples of unexplained differences in 
the fares for journeys of similar length. (It also concluded that 
the productivity of European airlines appear to be much lower than 
that of American carriers). The study also claimed that non-
scheduled operators would be able to operate scheduled services at 
fares some 20% lower than the present operators. 
The study concluded: "it is not inherent in the characteristics of 
European travel that fares should be high as is claimed so often by 
the major European carriers. This is a myth fostered to conceal 
their management inefficiency and work place culture. Competition 
is the classic remedy for these shortcomngsand it must be intro-
duced into Europe without delay." 
1European Air Fares. A report by the Airline Users Committee to the 
Civil Aviation Authority. 
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As the title of the study implies, the Civil Aviation Authority's 
study, issued in November 1977, had less sharply focussed conclusions 
than the AUC Study - and was more an initial examination of the problems 
raised from the point of view of a regulatory authority. The study 
included lengthy discussions of the problems involved in identifying 
costs, and of making meaningful international and inter-firm com-
parisons. Furthermore, on the definition of efficiency it concluded 
(p.20) that "existing approaches to efficiency assessment afforded no 
prospects of early results which can confidently be applied to regula-
tory policy". 
Nevertheless it did reach a number of tentative conclusions (p.20). 
It pointed out, for instance, that "the evidence does suggest that 
US costs and fares are lower than those of European airlines, although 
the differences are much smaller than often suggested by crude com-
parisons". It found on a number of specifically analysed routes that 
"the discrepancy between cost per first class passenger and fares was 
very substantial". It found it "hard to see the justification for 
this" and that the degree of cross-subsidization between first class 
and other fare categories was unacceptable". It also concluded that 
"on the short-haul routes examined, UK economy fares appeared to be 
reasonably related to British Airways cost levels, but on the longer 
routes studied, fares were substantially above cost, even with a 
full allowance for schedule convenience and a reasonable return on 
costs". 
(The CAA report also included a summary of discussions held with a 
wide range of interested parties, including a number who were 
critical of the current level of European air fares, and also an 
examination of a number of studies carried out previously on relative 
airline efficiency, such as the Taussig Report, which found - inter 
alia- that British Airways• fleet was inefficient compared to US 
carriers, the so-called "Anglo-American Study" which found that, 
having attempted to identify and quantify all the factors except 
inefficiency that might account for the difference in unit costs 
,, 
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between the UK and US airlines, there remained a residual cost 
difference of 16%, and the McKinsey Report which found that North 
American airlines achieved a significantly greater output per 
employee than their European counterparts. The CAA, however, 
merely noted, and did not endorse their conclusions>. 
This study, prepared by a group of consultants, Transportation 
Analysis International, for the European Comm1ssion, and issued in 
October 1980, did not analyse European air fares, but was intended 
to provide a methodology for the Commission in their future work on 
air transport costs, and the relationship of these costs to fare 
l~vels. It po1ntcd out th~ need for more complete information in 
the future and for both a cost model and a market/fares/yield model 
to be developed at Commun1ty level. It recommended that an attempt 
should be made to determ1ne the economic cost of various categories 
of traffic(such as first class, economy, APEX, no-frill, full 
charter, etc) 1n order to understand the compensatory aspects of 
each fare category before cross-subsidisation. One real problem 
that was 1dent1fied, however, was how to develop a uniform methodology 
for the ass1gnment of costs to specifically European rather than 
world-wlde.operations. 
The. study also recommended that the Community try to influence 
strongly those av1ation cost-related factors most likely to inhibit 
the growth of the system,landing, and en-route charges, fuel prices, 
re-equ1pment requirements and carrier return on investment, station 
and ground costs, and compet1tion. One conclusion of the study was 
the extent to which the costs of European air carriers were dominated 
by items over which the carrier had little control, such as landing 
and'en-route charges and fuel costs. Furthermore, it pointed out the 
extent to wh1ch national a1rlines were also subject to a number of 
non-commerci~l pressures, such as to serve unprofitable routes for 
social reasons, to create employment in the host country and to buy 
aircraft of local manufacture, wh1ch helped to undercut their 
efficiency. 
The European C1vil Av1at1on Conference report, published in 1981, con-
centrated on three sets of issues, whether scheduled European air 
fares were too high (by reference to scheduled fares outside Europe 
or to charter fares), whether they were inconsistent (e.g. by dis-
tance) and whether they discriminated unfairly between different 
categor1es of passenger. 
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The report concluded that there was little evidence that Euro-
pean services as a whole had earned excess profits, although intra-
European routes had generally achieved a level of profitability 
higher than the world average. Scheduled air transport services in 
the US tended to be relatively more efficient than those in Europe, 
but the difference was less than would be inferred from a simple 
comparison of the general level of fares in the two areas. Cost 
differences between scheduled and charter services were more attribut-
able to differences in mode than to efficiency, and that while some 
efficiency gap did appear to exist it had to be interpreted cautiously, 
and appeared to be a contributory rather than major cause of high Euro-
pean fares. 
On consistency of pricing the report found that European normal 
economy fares were reasonably closely related to distance, but with a 
taper in fares as distance increased, which was less, however, than 
the taper in costs. 
The task force found it impossible to reach unanimous conclusions 
on the issue of whether the European fare structure was discriminatory. 
For instance a major difference of view was apparent on the implications 
of prorating. 
It did, however, draw one or two important conclusions. It 
believed, for instance, that route costs could be identified with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy. "Consequently, the identification of 
price discrimination and the whole approach of relating fares to costs 
cannot be dismissed on the grounds of the arbitrariness of the alloca-
tion of costs to routes" (p.4). 
Furthermore, in looking at the costs of serving the on-demand 
market in isolation, the task force found that there was generally no 
problem on the shorter routes but that on the longer routes there was a 
general if not universal tendency for normal economy fares to exceed 
the costs of separate production - and on some of these routes the 
fare was found to be substantially above costs. 
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Draftsman: Mr KEY 
On 16 November 1981 the European Parliament referred the proposal from 
the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Directive 
on tariffs for scheduled air transport between Member States (Doe. l-740/81) 
to the Committee on Transport for its opinion. 
On 27 November 1981, the Committee on Transport appointed Mr KEY 
draftsman. 
The committee considered the draft op1n1on at its meetings of 
29 March 1982 and 29 April 1982 and adopted the opinion at its meeting 
of 27 May 1982 by 12 votes to 6 with 2 abstentions. 
·rile following took pnrt in the vote: Mr Secleld (<.•hairmara), 
Dame Shc~lugh Hobc-r-ts (vice-chairman), Mr Carroaino (vice-chairman), 
Mr ~aloy~:tnnis (vic~-chairman), Mr Key (C'":'e!tsma:-), Mr Al~er::~, M:- ~o!ud~.a 
Mr Ad<lmuu (d<'put.i:dnq (or Mr Cardia), Mr Cottrcll, Mr GaiJcrt, 
l.unt llclrm,u-Nic-holls, Mr lloffmann, Mr Junot, Mr Klinkcnbor~:~, Mr L;Jgc.~kos, 
Mr Moreland (deputizing for Mr Marshall), ~r Martin, Mr Moorhouse, Mr Loo 
(deputizing for Mr Ripa di Meana) and Mr Skovmand. 
The opinion representing the minority view of Dame Shelagh Roberts 
<vice-chairman), Mr Howell (deputizing for Mr Cottrell), Mr Turner 
(deputizing for Lord Harmar-Nicholls), Mr Junot, Mr Moreland 
(deput1zing for Mr Marshall), Mr Janssen van Raay (deputizing for Mr Modiano) 
and Mr Moorhouse is attached. 
. I 
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A. Main results of the air fares examination 
The proposed Tariff Directive is put forward on the basis of the 
conclusions in the Commission's Air Fares Study. Several important 
caveats need to be made. 
I (1) The Study used 1979 data,· a year of good airline traffic and 
economic performance. These assessments cannot simply be carried 
forward giv~n the seriously'dcteriorated airline results through 
1980/81 and expected in 1982. 
' ( 2) "rh<· Commission's services have indicated that the conclusions ln 
(c) and (h) that there may be "unreasonable profits" and "unfair 
prices" are not relevant for 90-95 \ of European routes. 
(3) To view pricing on a point-to-point, strictly cost basis is not 
helpful to the development of an integrated Community air trans-
port tariff structure. Pricing should take into account network 
costs of principal carriers on the route and also market factors 
such as potential demand, traffic mix, etc. 
(4.) It is not practicable to effect major changes with respect to the 
establishment. of scheduled air fares without dealing at the same 
time with charter traffic which amounts to some 50 I of intra-
Community air services. 
One of the main justifications for the Commission's proposal is "that 
the present tariff-setting procedures are time consuming and too rigid• 
(paras 3 (a) and (b). However, it is not the present systems which are 
time consuming but the way in which they are utilised by governments to 
require each and every tariff and product change to be approved, often 
at great length. The proposal would not alter that situation but would 
instead make it necessary for governments to acquire extensive and 
costly specialised knowledge to deal on a day-to-day basis with an 
incr~asing number of conflicting tariff proposals. This in turn would 
l~au to intergov~rnmental disagreements followed oy Commission arbi~~a­
tion, subject to possible review by the European Court of Just~ce. The 
new procedures will increase costs and delays, politicise disagr~cm~nts 
and l~ad to bur~au~1~tic expansion - hardly a recipe !or an im~roved 
and rapid process. 
3 c-g are the other main conclusions of the examination concerning 
profitability of European operations, cost allocation and pricing 
methodology. These factors need to be viewed against the background 
of public service obligations that many European a~rlines must apply, 
the inherently high cost of European operations and the protection of 
labour obligations inherent in the European social system. Such 
obligations would not be best served by the d1sruption lik~l) to occur 
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through the major changes ~ropoaed to the ~r~aent tarif£ syijtcms. 
Neither the consumer nor workers will benefit from such revolutionary 
measures which will force prices to levels where reasonable offsetting 
of losses on certain routes by benefits on others would not be possible 
and marginal routes would have to be abandoned and services concentrated 
on the high density major routes, a situation very much in evidence in 
the USA, where many small communities have lost services. 
B. The proposed Draft Directive 
ThP most distinctive feature of the Commission's proposal is that it 
movPI' i.IWClY from mullilaterallsm t.owardN unilateralism and Crnm 
f"unci I iat iu11 t(Jwards govt•rrunr>ntal ronfrontation. 
The Commission • s propos·al is moving toward• unilat~ral government. and 
airline tariff setting. This is not geared to the development of _an 
intergrated community tariff structure and would appear to contradict 
the very foundation of the European Communities, namely to promote 
closer relations between Member States. The proposal will distance 
EEC Member States from their governmental partners in the worldwide 
aviation community. 
(i) The proposed Directive suggest• introduction of tariff• on the 
basis of approval of the country of origin. Less than 2 \ of 
all bilateral agreements in the world apply country-of•ori9in 
type principles.These principles are in direct conflict with 
'• I j 
thP ECA<.' 1967 multilateral agreement on ..tariffs, which rclit•s 
. , 
ou bilateral procedures as a minimum and to which most EEC 
Member States and many non-EEC States are party. Implementation 
of the proposed system would probably mean denunciation and 
renegotlation of this agreement. It would also presumably lead 
to renegotiation of numerous bilateral agreements with non-EEC 
States. 
(ii) The proposal misconstrues the actual functioning of the a1rline 
coordination system (particularly in its new more flexible form) 
and would effectively preclude tariff coordination on point-to-
polnt fares and would jeopardise the interline system. Al~hough 
the Commission expresses its wish to continue to allow intcr-
lininq, it fail!. t.o see that t.hr> intc:>rlininq s~·sl(•m will ht• 
thrt'all'ncu .i.f cc1rriers c1re unable to discuss their ~oint -to-
point fares, which are competitively interrelated to each other 
and to interline tariffs. 
The Commission fails to recognise that the coordination of 
tariffs allows the development of an interrelated fares 
structure between Community States with other European 
States and with the worldwide system. 
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To conclude, the Commission is wrong in assuming that its proposal would 
not be disruptive and presents an evolutionary concept. Community air 
services are an integral part of the total European and world air network. 
We cannot effect the changes required under the Directive without serious 
repercussions upon that total system and on the commercial and legal 
obligations enshrined in numerous international trading agreements. For 
the consumer, the airlines and the governments, the maintenance of the 
present multilateral and bilateral systems of tari!f coordination and 
interlin~ability are too valuable to put at risk. However, improvements 
in the present system could and should be.achieved by building on that 
system along the following lines: 
C. AlternativP. 
Over the past few years the develop~ent of the fares structure on the 
North Atlantic has given an example of the adverse economic consequences 
of a too swift movement toward deregulation. The most extreme results of 
such a policy can be appreciated when looking at the U.S. domestic 
deregulation experience. It is significant that in recent negotiAtions 
bctw<.'f'!n ECAC governments and the U. S., a compromise systf:'m of ntc>dH it!d 
regulatory control is evolving and that in the international airline 
fora IATA has introduced a more flexible system for tariff setting. All 
these developments may well provide both a warning and a guideline for 
the intra-European air transport system. 
In essence the nrw system for North Atlantic fares 11 based on the 
eslablishm(•nt. of a series of "Zones of reasonableness• for each of the 
main categories of product (e.g. First, Economy, Discount). Withia 
these zones, airlines are free to compete at varying levelsJ any fare 
outside the zones remains subject to bilateral approval. A separate 
index. of cost changes would also be established as a measure against 
which fare adjustments may be reviewed and implemented. Such flexibility 
would ?roviac the desired improvement 1n tariff changes y~t be 
accomplished within the present multilateral and bilateral network. 
t.hus pr"s(•rving the need for common airl inf:' agreement on st.andards, 
intcrlincability and handling. 
Government• within ECAC are already exploring the possibility 
of introducing further flexibility in the present competitive 
environment of their airlines and EEC efforts should be 
coordinated with those ECAC activities. The airlines, for 
their part, should be encouraged through IATA to study the 
feasibility of 1ntroducing such added flexibility in the 
system. 
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It would, however, be eaaential.betore introducing any auch 
radical modification in the existing intra-European tarrif-
setting mechanism to await first the conclusion of a 
satisfactory agreement on the North Atlantic route and second 
its being experimented for at least a year or two in that 
area. 
The Committee on Transport draws attention to the report by 
Mr Carossino on the common transport policy (Doe. l-996/81) 
unanimously adopted by Parliament on 9 March 1982, which rightly 
~:t11tcs t.h1:1t 111 Pftrllam~nt's opinion future meaRurea~ in t.hc linld .of 
air tr~nsporl must be guided by tho following princ~ples: 
- improvement of the services offered to the transport userJ 
- reasonable ~onditions of operation for viable airlines under 
efficient management: 
- safeguarding and expansion of employment' 
- improvement of air traffic safety; 
reduction of environmental pollution by air trafficJ 
- energy saving. 
In the opinion of the Committee on Transport based on the above 
c·oiiMiciC'r<~t Inns, thn directive Buhmitted by the CommisMion fr1llR to 
c·omp 1 y w i t h t. h lr~ rN•Oftlmenda lion. 
Taking account of the counterproposal made in this document, Parliament 
is urged to approve a recommendation that the European Commission closely 
monitor d~velopments on the North Atlantic route and in EGAC and if 
appropriate in due course envisage the introduction of proposals for 
changes along the lines discussed above. 
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MINORITY OPINION 
A minority of members of the Transport Committee 
believe that the present air fare fixing system needs 
to be improved. Consequently, they support the Commission's 
proposed directive in the belief that it will introduce 
more scope for airline innovation and consumer choice 
without leading to d~sruptive effects or endangering the 
viability of Community airlines or entailing unacceptable 
labour disturbances. 
The minority believes that the Commission proposal 
follows a gradual evolutionary approach which would 
induce airlines and governments to consider new ideas. 
! • ll 
' 
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